mirror of
https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome.git
synced 2024-12-15 03:21:34 +03:00
805 lines
22 KiB
Go
805 lines
22 KiB
Go
package home
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/aghalg"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/aghhttp"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dnsforward"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/errors"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
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"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
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"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
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)
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var tlsWebHandlersRegistered = false
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// TLSMod - TLS module object
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type TLSMod struct {
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certLastMod time.Time // last modification time of the certificate file
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status tlsConfigStatus
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confLock sync.Mutex
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conf tlsConfigSettings
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}
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// Create TLS module
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func tlsCreate(conf tlsConfigSettings) *TLSMod {
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t := &TLSMod{}
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t.conf = conf
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if t.conf.Enabled {
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if !t.load() {
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// Something is not valid - return an empty TLS config
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return &TLSMod{conf: tlsConfigSettings{
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Enabled: conf.Enabled,
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ServerName: conf.ServerName,
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PortHTTPS: conf.PortHTTPS,
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PortDNSOverTLS: conf.PortDNSOverTLS,
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PortDNSOverQUIC: conf.PortDNSOverQUIC,
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AllowUnencryptedDoH: conf.AllowUnencryptedDoH,
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}}
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}
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t.setCertFileTime()
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}
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return t
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) load() bool {
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if !tlsLoadConfig(&t.conf, &t.status) {
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log.Error("failed to load TLS config: %s", t.status.WarningValidation)
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return false
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}
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// validate current TLS config and update warnings (it could have been loaded from file)
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data := validateCertificates(string(t.conf.CertificateChainData), string(t.conf.PrivateKeyData), t.conf.ServerName)
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if !data.ValidPair {
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log.Error("failed to validate certificate: %s", data.WarningValidation)
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return false
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}
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t.status = data
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return true
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}
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// Close - close module
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func (t *TLSMod) Close() {
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}
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// WriteDiskConfig - write config
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func (t *TLSMod) WriteDiskConfig(conf *tlsConfigSettings) {
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t.confLock.Lock()
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*conf = t.conf
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) setCertFileTime() {
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if len(t.conf.CertificatePath) == 0 {
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return
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}
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fi, err := os.Stat(t.conf.CertificatePath)
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if err != nil {
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log.Error("TLS: %s", err)
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return
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}
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t.certLastMod = fi.ModTime().UTC()
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}
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// Start updates the configuration of TLSMod and starts it.
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func (t *TLSMod) Start() {
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if !tlsWebHandlersRegistered {
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tlsWebHandlersRegistered = true
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t.registerWebHandlers()
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}
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t.confLock.Lock()
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tlsConf := t.conf
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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// The background context is used because the TLSConfigChanged wraps
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// context with timeout on its own and shuts down the server, which
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// handles current request.
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Context.web.TLSConfigChanged(context.Background(), tlsConf)
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}
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// Reload updates the configuration of TLSMod and restarts it.
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func (t *TLSMod) Reload() {
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t.confLock.Lock()
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tlsConf := t.conf
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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if !tlsConf.Enabled || len(tlsConf.CertificatePath) == 0 {
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return
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}
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fi, err := os.Stat(tlsConf.CertificatePath)
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if err != nil {
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log.Error("TLS: %s", err)
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return
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}
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if fi.ModTime().UTC().Equal(t.certLastMod) {
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log.Debug("TLS: certificate file isn't modified")
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return
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}
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log.Debug("TLS: certificate file is modified")
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t.confLock.Lock()
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r := t.load()
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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if !r {
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return
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}
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t.certLastMod = fi.ModTime().UTC()
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_ = reconfigureDNSServer()
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t.confLock.Lock()
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tlsConf = t.conf
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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// The background context is used because the TLSConfigChanged wraps
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// context with timeout on its own and shuts down the server, which
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// handles current request.
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Context.web.TLSConfigChanged(context.Background(), tlsConf)
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}
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// Set certificate and private key data
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func tlsLoadConfig(tls *tlsConfigSettings, status *tlsConfigStatus) bool {
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tls.CertificateChainData = []byte(tls.CertificateChain)
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tls.PrivateKeyData = []byte(tls.PrivateKey)
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var err error
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if tls.CertificatePath != "" {
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if tls.CertificateChain != "" {
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status.WarningValidation = "certificate data and file can't be set together"
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return false
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}
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tls.CertificateChainData, err = os.ReadFile(tls.CertificatePath)
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if err != nil {
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status.WarningValidation = err.Error()
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return false
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}
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status.ValidCert = true
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}
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if tls.PrivateKeyPath != "" {
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if tls.PrivateKey != "" {
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status.WarningValidation = "private key data and file can't be set together"
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return false
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}
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tls.PrivateKeyData, err = os.ReadFile(tls.PrivateKeyPath)
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if err != nil {
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status.WarningValidation = err.Error()
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return false
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}
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status.ValidKey = true
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}
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return true
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}
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type tlsConfigStatus struct {
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ValidCert bool `json:"valid_cert"` // ValidCert is true if the specified certificates chain is a valid chain of X509 certificates
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ValidChain bool `json:"valid_chain"` // ValidChain is true if the specified certificates chain is verified and issued by a known CA
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Subject string `json:"subject,omitempty"` // Subject is the subject of the first certificate in the chain
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Issuer string `json:"issuer,omitempty"` // Issuer is the issuer of the first certificate in the chain
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NotBefore time.Time `json:"not_before,omitempty"` // NotBefore is the NotBefore field of the first certificate in the chain
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NotAfter time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"` // NotAfter is the NotAfter field of the first certificate in the chain
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DNSNames []string `json:"dns_names"` // DNSNames is the value of SubjectAltNames field of the first certificate in the chain
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// key status
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ValidKey bool `json:"valid_key"` // ValidKey is true if the key is a valid private key
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KeyType string `json:"key_type,omitempty"` // KeyType is one of RSA or ECDSA
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// is usable? set by validator
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ValidPair bool `json:"valid_pair"` // ValidPair is true if both certificate and private key are correct
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// warnings
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WarningValidation string `json:"warning_validation,omitempty"` // WarningValidation is a validation warning message with the issue description
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}
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// field ordering is important -- yaml fields will mirror ordering from here
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type tlsConfig struct {
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tlsConfigStatus `json:",inline"`
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tlsConfigSettingsExt `json:",inline"`
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}
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// tlsConfigSettingsExt is used to (un)marshal PrivateKeySaved to ensure that
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// clients don't send and receive previously saved private keys.
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type tlsConfigSettingsExt struct {
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tlsConfigSettings `json:",inline"`
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// If private key saved as a string, we set this flag to true
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// and omit key from answer.
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PrivateKeySaved bool `yaml:"-" json:"private_key_saved,inline"`
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) handleTLSStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.confLock.Lock()
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data := tlsConfig{
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tlsConfigSettingsExt: tlsConfigSettingsExt{
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tlsConfigSettings: t.conf,
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},
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tlsConfigStatus: t.status,
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}
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t.confLock.Unlock()
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marshalTLS(w, r, data)
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) handleTLSValidate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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setts, err := unmarshalTLS(r)
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if err != nil {
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aghhttp.Error(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to unmarshal TLS config: %s", err)
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return
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}
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if setts.PrivateKeySaved {
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setts.PrivateKey = t.conf.PrivateKey
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}
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if setts.Enabled {
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err = validatePorts(
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tcpPort(config.BindPort),
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tcpPort(config.BetaBindPort),
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tcpPort(setts.PortHTTPS),
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tcpPort(setts.PortDNSOverTLS),
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tcpPort(setts.PortDNSCrypt),
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udpPort(config.DNS.Port),
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udpPort(setts.PortDNSOverQUIC),
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)
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if err != nil {
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aghhttp.Error(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "%s", err)
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return
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}
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}
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if !WebCheckPortAvailable(setts.PortHTTPS) {
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aghhttp.Error(
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r,
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w,
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http.StatusBadRequest,
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"port %d is not available, cannot enable HTTPS on it",
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setts.PortHTTPS,
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)
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return
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}
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status := tlsConfigStatus{}
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if tlsLoadConfig(&setts.tlsConfigSettings, &status) {
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status = validateCertificates(string(setts.CertificateChainData), string(setts.PrivateKeyData), setts.ServerName)
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}
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data := tlsConfig{
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tlsConfigSettingsExt: setts,
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tlsConfigStatus: status,
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}
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marshalTLS(w, r, data)
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) setConfig(newConf tlsConfigSettings, status tlsConfigStatus) (restartHTTPS bool) {
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t.confLock.Lock()
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defer t.confLock.Unlock()
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// Reset the DNSCrypt data before comparing, since we currently do not
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// accept these from the frontend.
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//
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// TODO(a.garipov): Define a custom comparer for dnsforward.TLSConfig.
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newConf.DNSCryptConfigFile = t.conf.DNSCryptConfigFile
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newConf.PortDNSCrypt = t.conf.PortDNSCrypt
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if !cmp.Equal(t.conf, newConf, cmp.AllowUnexported(dnsforward.TLSConfig{})) {
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log.Info("tls config has changed, restarting https server")
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restartHTTPS = true
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} else {
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log.Info("tls config has not changed")
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}
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// Note: don't do just `t.conf = data` because we must preserve all other members of t.conf
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t.conf.Enabled = newConf.Enabled
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t.conf.ServerName = newConf.ServerName
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t.conf.ForceHTTPS = newConf.ForceHTTPS
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t.conf.PortHTTPS = newConf.PortHTTPS
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t.conf.PortDNSOverTLS = newConf.PortDNSOverTLS
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t.conf.PortDNSOverQUIC = newConf.PortDNSOverQUIC
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t.conf.CertificateChain = newConf.CertificateChain
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t.conf.CertificatePath = newConf.CertificatePath
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t.conf.CertificateChainData = newConf.CertificateChainData
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t.conf.PrivateKey = newConf.PrivateKey
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t.conf.PrivateKeyPath = newConf.PrivateKeyPath
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t.conf.PrivateKeyData = newConf.PrivateKeyData
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t.status = status
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return restartHTTPS
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}
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func (t *TLSMod) handleTLSConfigure(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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data, err := unmarshalTLS(r)
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if err != nil {
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aghhttp.Error(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to unmarshal TLS config: %s", err)
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return
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}
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if data.PrivateKeySaved {
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data.PrivateKey = t.conf.PrivateKey
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}
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if data.Enabled {
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err = validatePorts(
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tcpPort(config.BindPort),
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tcpPort(config.BetaBindPort),
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tcpPort(data.PortHTTPS),
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tcpPort(data.PortDNSOverTLS),
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tcpPort(data.PortDNSCrypt),
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udpPort(config.DNS.Port),
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udpPort(data.PortDNSOverQUIC),
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)
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if err != nil {
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aghhttp.Error(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "%s", err)
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return
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}
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}
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// TODO(e.burkov): Investigate and perhaps check other ports.
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if !WebCheckPortAvailable(data.PortHTTPS) {
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aghhttp.Error(
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r,
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w,
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http.StatusBadRequest,
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"port %d is not available, cannot enable HTTPS on it",
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data.PortHTTPS,
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)
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return
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}
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status := tlsConfigStatus{}
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if !tlsLoadConfig(&data.tlsConfigSettings, &status) {
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data2 := tlsConfig{
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tlsConfigSettingsExt: data,
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tlsConfigStatus: t.status,
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}
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marshalTLS(w, r, data2)
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return
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}
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status = validateCertificates(string(data.CertificateChainData), string(data.PrivateKeyData), data.ServerName)
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restartHTTPS := t.setConfig(data.tlsConfigSettings, status)
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t.setCertFileTime()
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onConfigModified()
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err = reconfigureDNSServer()
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if err != nil {
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aghhttp.Error(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "%s", err)
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return
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}
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data2 := tlsConfig{
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tlsConfigSettingsExt: data,
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tlsConfigStatus: t.status,
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}
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marshalTLS(w, r, data2)
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if f, ok := w.(http.Flusher); ok {
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f.Flush()
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}
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// The background context is used because the TLSConfigChanged wraps context
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// with timeout on its own and shuts down the server, which handles current
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// request. It is also should be done in a separate goroutine due to the
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// same reason.
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if restartHTTPS {
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go func() {
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Context.web.TLSConfigChanged(context.Background(), data.tlsConfigSettings)
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}()
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}
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}
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// validatePorts validates the uniqueness of TCP and UDP ports for AdGuard Home
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// DNS protocols.
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func validatePorts(
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bindPort, betaBindPort, dohPort, dotPort, dnscryptTCPPort tcpPort,
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dnsPort, doqPort udpPort,
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) (err error) {
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tcpPorts := aghalg.UniqChecker[tcpPort]{}
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addPorts(
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tcpPorts,
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tcpPort(bindPort),
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tcpPort(betaBindPort),
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tcpPort(dohPort),
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tcpPort(dotPort),
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tcpPort(dnscryptTCPPort),
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)
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err = tcpPorts.Validate()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("validating tcp ports: %w", err)
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}
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udpPorts := aghalg.UniqChecker[udpPort]{}
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addPorts(udpPorts, udpPort(dnsPort), udpPort(doqPort))
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err = udpPorts.Validate()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("validating udp ports: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func verifyCertChain(data *tlsConfigStatus, certChain, serverName string) error {
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log.Tracef("TLS: got certificate: %d bytes", len(certChain))
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// now do a more extended validation
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var certs []*pem.Block // PEM-encoded certificates
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pemblock := []byte(certChain)
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for {
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var decoded *pem.Block
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decoded, pemblock = pem.Decode(pemblock)
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if decoded == nil {
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break
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}
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if decoded.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
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certs = append(certs, decoded)
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}
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}
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var parsedCerts []*x509.Certificate
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for _, cert := range certs {
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parsed, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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data.WarningValidation = fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse certificate: %s", err)
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return errors.Error(data.WarningValidation)
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}
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parsedCerts = append(parsedCerts, parsed)
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}
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if len(parsedCerts) == 0 {
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data.WarningValidation = "You have specified an empty certificate"
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return errors.Error(data.WarningValidation)
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}
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data.ValidCert = true
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// spew.Dump(parsedCerts)
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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DNSName: serverName,
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Roots: Context.tlsRoots,
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}
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log.Printf("number of certs - %d", len(parsedCerts))
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if len(parsedCerts) > 1 {
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// set up an intermediate
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pool := x509.NewCertPool()
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for _, cert := range parsedCerts[1:] {
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log.Printf("got an intermediate cert")
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pool.AddCert(cert)
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}
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opts.Intermediates = pool
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}
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// TODO: save it as a warning rather than error it out -- shouldn't be a big problem
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mainCert := parsedCerts[0]
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_, err := mainCert.Verify(opts)
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if err != nil {
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// let self-signed certs through
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data.WarningValidation = fmt.Sprintf("Your certificate does not verify: %s", err)
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} else {
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data.ValidChain = true
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}
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// spew.Dump(chains)
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// update status
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if mainCert != nil {
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notAfter := mainCert.NotAfter
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data.Subject = mainCert.Subject.String()
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data.Issuer = mainCert.Issuer.String()
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data.NotAfter = notAfter
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data.NotBefore = mainCert.NotBefore
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data.DNSNames = mainCert.DNSNames
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validatePkey(data *tlsConfigStatus, pkey string) error {
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// now do a more extended validation
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var key *pem.Block // PEM-encoded certificates
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// go through all pem blocks, but take first valid pem block and drop the rest
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pemblock := []byte(pkey)
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for {
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var decoded *pem.Block
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decoded, pemblock = pem.Decode(pemblock)
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if decoded == nil {
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break
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}
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|
|
if decoded.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(decoded.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
|
|
key = decoded
|
|
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if key == nil {
|
|
data.WarningValidation = "No valid keys were found"
|
|
|
|
return errors.Error(data.WarningValidation)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parse the decoded key
|
|
_, keyType, err := parsePrivateKey(key.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
data.WarningValidation = fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse private key: %s", err)
|
|
|
|
return errors.Error(data.WarningValidation)
|
|
} else if keyType == keyTypeED25519 {
|
|
data.WarningValidation = "ED25519 keys are not supported by browsers; " +
|
|
"did you mean to use X25519 for key exchange?"
|
|
|
|
return errors.Error(data.WarningValidation)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data.ValidKey = true
|
|
data.KeyType = keyType
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateCertificates processes certificate data and its private key. All
|
|
// parameters are optional. On error, validateCertificates returns a partially
|
|
// set object with field WarningValidation containing error description.
|
|
func validateCertificates(certChain, pkey, serverName string) tlsConfigStatus {
|
|
var data tlsConfigStatus
|
|
|
|
// check only public certificate separately from the key
|
|
if certChain != "" {
|
|
if verifyCertChain(&data, certChain, serverName) != nil {
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate private key (right now the only validation possible is just parsing it)
|
|
if pkey != "" {
|
|
if validatePkey(&data, pkey) != nil {
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if both are set, validate both in unison
|
|
if pkey != "" && certChain != "" {
|
|
_, err := tls.X509KeyPair([]byte(certChain), []byte(pkey))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
data.WarningValidation = fmt.Sprintf("Invalid certificate or key: %s", err)
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
data.ValidPair = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Key types.
|
|
const (
|
|
keyTypeECDSA = "ECDSA"
|
|
keyTypeED25519 = "ED25519"
|
|
keyTypeRSA = "RSA"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
|
// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
|
|
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(a.garipov): Find out if this version of parsePrivateKey from the stdlib
|
|
// is actually necessary.
|
|
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (key crypto.PrivateKey, typ string, err error) {
|
|
if key, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, keyTypeRSA, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if key, err = x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
switch key := key.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, keyTypeRSA, nil
|
|
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, keyTypeECDSA, nil
|
|
case ed25519.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, keyTypeED25519, nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"tls: found unknown private key type %T in PKCS#8 wrapping",
|
|
key,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if key, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, keyTypeECDSA, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, "", errors.Error("tls: failed to parse private key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unmarshalTLS handles base64-encoded certificates transparently
|
|
func unmarshalTLS(r *http.Request) (tlsConfigSettingsExt, error) {
|
|
data := tlsConfigSettingsExt{}
|
|
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return data, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse new TLS config json: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if data.CertificateChain != "" {
|
|
var cert []byte
|
|
cert, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(data.CertificateChain)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return data, fmt.Errorf("failed to base64-decode certificate chain: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data.CertificateChain = string(cert)
|
|
if data.CertificatePath != "" {
|
|
return data, fmt.Errorf("certificate data and file can't be set together")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if data.PrivateKey != "" {
|
|
var key []byte
|
|
key, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(data.PrivateKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return data, fmt.Errorf("failed to base64-decode private key: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data.PrivateKey = string(key)
|
|
if data.PrivateKeyPath != "" {
|
|
return data, fmt.Errorf("private key data and file can't be set together")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func marshalTLS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data tlsConfig) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
|
|
if data.CertificateChain != "" {
|
|
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(data.CertificateChain))
|
|
data.CertificateChain = encoded
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if data.PrivateKey != "" {
|
|
data.PrivateKeySaved = true
|
|
data.PrivateKey = ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
aghhttp.Error(
|
|
r,
|
|
w,
|
|
http.StatusInternalServerError,
|
|
"Failed to marshal json with TLS status: %s",
|
|
err,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// registerWebHandlers registers HTTP handlers for TLS configuration
|
|
func (t *TLSMod) registerWebHandlers() {
|
|
httpRegister(http.MethodGet, "/control/tls/status", t.handleTLSStatus)
|
|
httpRegister(http.MethodPost, "/control/tls/configure", t.handleTLSConfigure)
|
|
httpRegister(http.MethodPost, "/control/tls/validate", t.handleTLSValidate)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoadSystemRootCAs tries to load root certificates from the operating system.
|
|
// It returns nil in case nothing is found so that that Go.crypto will use it's
|
|
// default algorithm to find system root CA list.
|
|
//
|
|
// See https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/issues/1311.
|
|
func LoadSystemRootCAs() (roots *x509.CertPool) {
|
|
// TODO(e.burkov): Use build tags instead.
|
|
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Directories with the system root certificates, which aren't supported
|
|
// by Go.crypto.
|
|
dirs := []string{
|
|
// Entware.
|
|
"/opt/etc/ssl/certs",
|
|
}
|
|
roots = x509.NewCertPool()
|
|
for _, dir := range dirs {
|
|
dirEnts, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
|
|
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
|
|
continue
|
|
} else if err != nil {
|
|
log.Error("opening directory: %q: %s", dir, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var rootsAdded bool
|
|
for _, de := range dirEnts {
|
|
var certData []byte
|
|
certData, err = os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, de.Name()))
|
|
if err == nil && roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(certData) {
|
|
rootsAdded = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if rootsAdded {
|
|
return roots
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// InitTLSCiphers performs the same work as initDefaultCipherSuites() from
|
|
// crypto/tls/common.go but don't uses lots of other default ciphers.
|
|
func InitTLSCiphers() (ciphers []uint16) {
|
|
// Check the cpu flags for each platform that has optimized GCM
|
|
// implementations. The worst case is when all these variables are
|
|
// false.
|
|
var (
|
|
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
|
|
hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
|
|
// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
|
|
hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES &&
|
|
cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC &&
|
|
cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
|
|
(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
|
|
|
|
hasGCMAsm = hasGCMAsmAMD64 || hasGCMAsmARM64 || hasGCMAsmS390X
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if hasGCMAsm {
|
|
// If AES-GCM hardware is provided then prioritize AES-GCM
|
|
// cipher suites.
|
|
ciphers = []uint16{
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Without AES-GCM hardware, we put the ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher
|
|
// suites first.
|
|
ciphers = []uint16{
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return append(
|
|
ciphers,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|