mirror of
https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome.git
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e529d29e8a
Squashed commit of the following: commit e8e6dba18b8f44392bd88999e481723a00aa3042 Merge:929283702
41cce6259
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com> Date: Tue Oct 22 13:46:26 2024 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into AGDNS-2374-slog-client commit929283702a
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com> Date: Tue Oct 15 14:30:00 2024 +0300 client: imp tests commitf29d8edb89
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com> Date: Mon Oct 14 15:03:08 2024 +0300 client: imp docs commit0b4311ac26
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com> Date: Fri Oct 11 19:12:50 2024 +0300 all: imp code commit1ad99ee3cb
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com> Date: Thu Oct 10 20:59:46 2024 +0300 all: slog client
646 lines
18 KiB
Go
646 lines
18 KiB
Go
package dnsforward
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import (
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"cmp"
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"context"
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"encoding/binary"
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"net"
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"net/netip"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/filtering"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/netutil"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// To transfer information between modules
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//
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// TODO(s.chzhen): Add lowercased, non-FQDN version of the hostname from the
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// question of the request. Add persistent client.
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type dnsContext struct {
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proxyCtx *proxy.DNSContext
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// setts are the filtering settings for the client.
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setts *filtering.Settings
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result *filtering.Result
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// origResp is the response received from upstream. It is set when the
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// response is modified by filters.
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origResp *dns.Msg
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// err is the error returned from a processing function.
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err error
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// clientID is the ClientID from DoH, DoQ, or DoT, if provided.
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clientID string
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// startTime is the time at which the processing of the request has started.
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startTime time.Time
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// origQuestion is the question received from the client. It is set
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// when the request is modified by rewrites.
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origQuestion dns.Question
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// protectionEnabled shows if the filtering is enabled, and if the
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// server's DNS filter is ready.
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protectionEnabled bool
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// responseFromUpstream shows if the response is received from the
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// upstream servers.
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responseFromUpstream bool
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// responseAD shows if the response had the AD bit set.
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responseAD bool
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// isDHCPHost is true if the request for a local domain name and the DHCP is
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// available for this request.
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isDHCPHost bool
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}
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// resultCode is the result of a request processing function.
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type resultCode int
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const (
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// resultCodeSuccess is returned when a handler performed successfully, and
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// the next handler must be called.
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resultCodeSuccess resultCode = iota
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// resultCodeFinish is returned when a handler performed successfully, and
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// the processing of the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeFinish
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// resultCodeError is returned when a handler failed, and the processing of
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// the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeError
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)
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// ddrHostFQDN is the FQDN used in Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR) requests.
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// See https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-06.html.
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const ddrHostFQDN = "_dns.resolver.arpa."
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// handleDNSRequest filters the incoming DNS requests and writes them to the query log
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func (s *Server) handleDNSRequest(_ *proxy.Proxy, pctx *proxy.DNSContext) error {
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dctx := &dnsContext{
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proxyCtx: pctx,
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result: &filtering.Result{},
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startTime: time.Now(),
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}
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type modProcessFunc func(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode)
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// Since (*dnsforward.Server).handleDNSRequest(...) is used as
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// proxy.(Config).RequestHandler, there is no need for additional index
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// out of range checking in any of the following functions, because the
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// (*proxy.Proxy).handleDNSRequest method performs it before calling the
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// appropriate handler.
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mods := []modProcessFunc{
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s.processInitial,
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s.processDDRQuery,
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s.processDHCPHosts,
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s.processDHCPAddrs,
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s.processFilteringBeforeRequest,
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s.processUpstream,
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s.processFilteringAfterResponse,
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s.ipset.process,
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s.processQueryLogsAndStats,
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}
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for _, process := range mods {
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r := process(dctx)
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switch r {
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case resultCodeSuccess:
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// continue: call the next filter
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case resultCodeFinish:
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return nil
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case resultCodeError:
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return dctx.err
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}
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}
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if pctx.Res != nil {
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// Some devices require DNS message compression.
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pctx.Res.Compress = true
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}
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return nil
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}
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// mozillaFQDN is the domain used to signal the Firefox browser to not use its
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// own DoH server.
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//
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// See https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet.
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const mozillaFQDN = "use-application-dns.net."
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// healthcheckFQDN is a reserved domain-name used for healthchecking.
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//
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// [Section 6.2 of RFC 6761] states that DNS Registries/Registrars must not
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// grant requests to register test names in the normal way to any person or
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// entity, making domain names under the .test TLD free to use in internal
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// purposes.
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//
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// [Section 6.2 of RFC 6761]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6761.html#section-6.2
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const healthcheckFQDN = "healthcheck.adguardhome.test."
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// processInitial terminates the following processing for some requests if
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// needed and enriches dctx with some client-specific information.
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//
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// TODO(e.burkov): Decompose into less general processors.
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func (s *Server) processInitial(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing initial")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing initial")
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pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
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s.processClientIP(pctx.Addr.Addr())
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q := pctx.Req.Question[0]
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qt := q.Qtype
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if s.conf.AAAADisabled && qt == dns.TypeAAAA {
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pctx.Res = s.NewMsgNODATA(pctx.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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if (qt == dns.TypeA || qt == dns.TypeAAAA) && q.Name == mozillaFQDN {
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pctx.Res = s.NewMsgNXDOMAIN(pctx.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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if q.Name == healthcheckFQDN {
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// Generate a NODATA negative response to make nslookup exit with 0.
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pctx.Res = s.replyCompressed(pctx.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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// Get the ClientID, if any, before getting client-specific filtering
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// settings.
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var key [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(key[:], pctx.RequestID)
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dctx.clientID = string(s.clientIDCache.Get(key[:]))
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// Get the client-specific filtering settings.
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dctx.protectionEnabled, _ = s.UpdatedProtectionStatus()
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dctx.setts = s.clientRequestFilteringSettings(dctx)
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// processClientIP sends the client IP address to s.addrProc, if needed.
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func (s *Server) processClientIP(addr netip.Addr) {
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if !addr.IsValid() {
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log.Info("dnsforward: warning: bad client addr %q", addr)
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return
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}
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// Do not assign s.addrProc to a local variable to then use, since this lock
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// also serializes the closure of s.addrProc.
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s.serverLock.RLock()
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defer s.serverLock.RUnlock()
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// TODO(s.chzhen): Pass context.
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s.addrProc.Process(context.TODO(), addr)
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}
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// processDDRQuery responds to Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR) SVCB
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// queries. The response contains different types of encryption supported by
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// current user configuration.
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//
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// See https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-10.html.
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func (s *Server) processDDRQuery(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing ddr")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing ddr")
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if !s.conf.HandleDDR {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
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q := pctx.Req.Question[0]
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if q.Name == ddrHostFQDN {
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pctx.Res = s.makeDDRResponse(pctx.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// makeDDRResponse creates a DDR answer based on the server configuration. The
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// constructed SVCB resource records have the priority of 1 for each entry,
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// similar to examples provided by the [draft standard].
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//
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// TODO(a.meshkov): Consider setting the priority values based on the protocol.
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//
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// [draft standard]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-10.html.
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func (s *Server) makeDDRResponse(req *dns.Msg) (resp *dns.Msg) {
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resp = s.replyCompressed(req)
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if req.Question[0].Qtype != dns.TypeSVCB {
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return resp
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}
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// TODO(e.burkov): Think about storing the FQDN version of the server's
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// name somewhere.
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domainName := dns.Fqdn(s.conf.ServerName)
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for _, addr := range s.conf.HTTPSListenAddrs {
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values := []dns.SVCBKeyValue{
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&dns.SVCBAlpn{Alpn: []string{"h2"}},
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&dns.SVCBPort{Port: uint16(addr.Port)},
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&dns.SVCBDoHPath{Template: "/dns-query{?dns}"},
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}
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ans := &dns.SVCB{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeSVCB),
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Priority: 1,
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Target: domainName,
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Value: values,
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ans)
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}
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if s.conf.hasIPAddrs {
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// Only add DNS-over-TLS resolvers in case the certificate contains IP
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// addresses.
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//
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// See https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/issues/4927.
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for _, addr := range s.dnsProxy.TLSListenAddr {
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values := []dns.SVCBKeyValue{
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&dns.SVCBAlpn{Alpn: []string{"dot"}},
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&dns.SVCBPort{Port: uint16(addr.Port)},
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}
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ans := &dns.SVCB{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeSVCB),
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Priority: 1,
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Target: domainName,
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Value: values,
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ans)
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}
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}
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for _, addr := range s.dnsProxy.QUICListenAddr {
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values := []dns.SVCBKeyValue{
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&dns.SVCBAlpn{Alpn: []string{"doq"}},
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&dns.SVCBPort{Port: uint16(addr.Port)},
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}
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ans := &dns.SVCB{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeSVCB),
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Priority: 1,
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Target: domainName,
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Value: values,
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ans)
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}
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return resp
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}
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// processDHCPHosts respond to A requests if the target hostname is known to
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// the server. It responds with a mapped IP address if the DNS64 is enabled and
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// the request is for AAAA.
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//
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// TODO(a.garipov): Adapt to AAAA as well.
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func (s *Server) processDHCPHosts(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing dhcp hosts")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing dhcp hosts")
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pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
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req := pctx.Req
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q := &req.Question[0]
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dhcpHost := s.dhcpHostFromRequest(q)
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if dctx.isDHCPHost = dhcpHost != ""; !dctx.isDHCPHost {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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if !pctx.IsPrivateClient {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: %q requests for dhcp host %q", pctx.Addr, dhcpHost)
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pctx.Res = s.NewMsgNXDOMAIN(req)
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// Do not even put into query log.
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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ip := s.dhcpServer.IPByHost(dhcpHost)
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if ip == (netip.Addr{}) {
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// Go on and process them with filters, including dnsrewrite ones, and
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// possibly route them to a domain-specific upstream.
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log.Debug("dnsforward: no dhcp record for %q", dhcpHost)
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("dnsforward: dhcp record for %q is %s", dhcpHost, ip)
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resp := s.replyCompressed(req)
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switch q.Qtype {
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case dns.TypeA:
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a := &dns.A{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeA),
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A: ip.AsSlice(),
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, a)
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case dns.TypeAAAA:
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if s.dns64Pref != (netip.Prefix{}) {
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// Respond with DNS64-mapped address for IPv4 host if DNS64 is
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// enabled.
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aaaa := &dns.AAAA{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeAAAA),
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AAAA: s.mapDNS64(ip),
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, aaaa)
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}
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default:
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// Go on.
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}
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dctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// processDHCPAddrs responds to PTR requests if the target IP is leased by the
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// DHCP server.
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func (s *Server) processDHCPAddrs(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing dhcp addrs")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing dhcp addrs")
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pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
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if pctx.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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req := pctx.Req
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q := req.Question[0]
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pref := pctx.RequestedPrivateRDNS
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// TODO(e.burkov): Consider answering authoritatively for SOA and NS
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// queries.
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if pref == (netip.Prefix{}) || q.Qtype != dns.TypePTR {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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addr := pref.Addr()
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host := s.dhcpServer.HostByIP(addr)
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if host == "" {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("dnsforward: dhcp client %s is %q", addr, host)
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resp := s.replyCompressed(req)
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ptr := &dns.PTR{
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Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
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Name: q.Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypePTR,
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// TODO(e.burkov): Use [dhcpsvc.Lease.Expiry]. See
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// https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/issues/3932.
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Ttl: s.dnsFilter.BlockedResponseTTL(),
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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},
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Ptr: dns.Fqdn(strings.Join([]string{host, s.localDomainSuffix}, ".")),
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ptr)
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pctx.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Apply filtering logic
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func (s *Server) processFilteringBeforeRequest(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing filtering before req")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing filtering before req")
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if dctx.proxyCtx.RequestedPrivateRDNS != (netip.Prefix{}) {
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// There is no need to filter request for locally served ARPA hostname
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// so disable redundant filters.
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dctx.setts.ParentalEnabled = false
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dctx.setts.SafeBrowsingEnabled = false
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dctx.setts.SafeSearchEnabled = false
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dctx.setts.ServicesRules = nil
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}
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if dctx.proxyCtx.Res != nil {
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// Go on since the response is already set.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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s.serverLock.RLock()
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defer s.serverLock.RUnlock()
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var err error
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if dctx.result, err = s.filterDNSRequest(dctx); err != nil {
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dctx.err = err
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return resultCodeError
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}
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// ipStringFromAddr extracts an IP address string from net.Addr.
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func ipStringFromAddr(addr net.Addr) (ipStr string) {
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if ip, _ := netutil.IPAndPortFromAddr(addr); ip != nil {
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return ip.String()
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}
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return ""
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}
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// processUpstream passes request to upstream servers and handles the response.
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func (s *Server) processUpstream(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing upstream")
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defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing upstream")
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pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
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req := pctx.Req
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if pctx.Res != nil {
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// The response has already been set.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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} else if dctx.isDHCPHost {
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// A DHCP client hostname query that hasn't been handled or filtered.
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// Respond with an NXDOMAIN.
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//
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// TODO(a.garipov): Route such queries to a custom upstream for the
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// local domain name if there is one.
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name := req.Question[0].Name
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log.Debug("dnsforward: dhcp client hostname %q was not filtered", name[:len(name)-1])
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pctx.Res = s.NewMsgNXDOMAIN(req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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s.setCustomUpstream(pctx, dctx.clientID)
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reqWantsDNSSEC := s.setReqAD(req)
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// Process the request further since it wasn't filtered.
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prx := s.proxy()
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if prx == nil {
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dctx.err = srvClosedErr
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return resultCodeError
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}
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if dctx.err = prx.Resolve(pctx); dctx.err != nil {
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return resultCodeError
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}
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dctx.responseFromUpstream = true
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dctx.responseAD = pctx.Res.AuthenticatedData
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s.setRespAD(pctx, reqWantsDNSSEC)
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setReqAD changes the request based on the server settings. wantsDNSSEC is
|
|
// false if the response should be cleared of the AD bit.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(a.garipov, e.burkov): This should probably be done in module dnsproxy.
|
|
func (s *Server) setReqAD(req *dns.Msg) (wantsDNSSEC bool) {
|
|
if !s.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
origReqAD := req.AuthenticatedData
|
|
req.AuthenticatedData = true
|
|
|
|
// Per [RFC 6840] says, validating resolvers should only set the AD bit when
|
|
// the response has the AD bit set and the request contained either a set DO
|
|
// bit or a set AD bit. So, if neither of these is true, clear the AD bits
|
|
// in [Server.setRespAD].
|
|
//
|
|
// [RFC 6840]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6840#section-5.8
|
|
return origReqAD || hasDO(req)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasDO returns true if msg has EDNS(0) options and the DNSSEC OK flag is set
|
|
// in there.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(a.garipov): Move to golibs/dnsmsg when it's there.
|
|
func hasDO(msg *dns.Msg) (do bool) {
|
|
o := msg.IsEdns0()
|
|
if o == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return o.Do()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setRespAD changes the request and response based on the server settings and
|
|
// the original request data.
|
|
func (s *Server) setRespAD(pctx *proxy.DNSContext, reqWantsDNSSEC bool) {
|
|
if s.conf.EnableDNSSEC && !reqWantsDNSSEC {
|
|
pctx.Req.AuthenticatedData = false
|
|
pctx.Res.AuthenticatedData = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// dhcpHostFromRequest returns a hostname from question, if the request is for a
|
|
// DHCP client's hostname when DHCP is enabled, and an empty string otherwise.
|
|
func (s *Server) dhcpHostFromRequest(q *dns.Question) (reqHost string) {
|
|
if !s.dhcpServer.Enabled() {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Include AAAA here, because despite the fact that we don't support it yet,
|
|
// the expected behavior here is to respond with an empty answer and not
|
|
// NXDOMAIN.
|
|
if qt := q.Qtype; qt != dns.TypeA && qt != dns.TypeAAAA {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reqHost = strings.ToLower(q.Name[:len(q.Name)-1])
|
|
if !netutil.IsImmediateSubdomain(reqHost, s.localDomainSuffix) {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return reqHost[:len(reqHost)-len(s.localDomainSuffix)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setCustomUpstream sets custom upstream settings in pctx, if necessary.
|
|
func (s *Server) setCustomUpstream(pctx *proxy.DNSContext, clientID string) {
|
|
if !pctx.Addr.IsValid() || s.conf.ClientsContainer == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use the ClientID first, since it has a higher priority.
|
|
id := cmp.Or(clientID, pctx.Addr.Addr().String())
|
|
upsConf, err := s.conf.ClientsContainer.UpstreamConfigByID(id, s.bootstrap)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Error("dnsforward: getting custom upstreams for client %s: %s", id, err)
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if upsConf != nil {
|
|
log.Debug("dnsforward: using custom upstreams for client %s", id)
|
|
|
|
pctx.CustomUpstreamConfig = upsConf
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply filtering logic after we have received response from upstream servers
|
|
func (s *Server) processFilteringAfterResponse(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
|
|
log.Debug("dnsforward: started processing filtering after resp")
|
|
defer log.Debug("dnsforward: finished processing filtering after resp")
|
|
|
|
switch res := dctx.result; res.Reason {
|
|
case filtering.NotFilteredAllowList:
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
case
|
|
filtering.Rewritten,
|
|
filtering.RewrittenRule,
|
|
filtering.FilteredSafeSearch:
|
|
|
|
if dctx.origQuestion.Name == "" {
|
|
// origQuestion is set in case we get only CNAME without IP from
|
|
// rewrites table.
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pctx := dctx.proxyCtx
|
|
pctx.Req.Question[0], pctx.Res.Question[0] = dctx.origQuestion, dctx.origQuestion
|
|
|
|
rr := s.genAnswerCNAME(pctx.Req, res.CanonName)
|
|
answer := append([]dns.RR{rr}, pctx.Res.Answer...)
|
|
pctx.Res.Answer = answer
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
default:
|
|
return s.filterAfterResponse(dctx)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// filterAfterResponse returns the result of filtering the response that wasn't
|
|
// explicitly allowed or rewritten.
|
|
func (s *Server) filterAfterResponse(dctx *dnsContext) (res resultCode) {
|
|
// Check the response only if it's from an upstream. Don't check the
|
|
// response if the protection is disabled since dnsrewrite rules aren't
|
|
// applied to it anyway.
|
|
if !dctx.protectionEnabled || !dctx.responseFromUpstream {
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := s.filterDNSResponse(dctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
dctx.err = err
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|